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R47Cognitive Development: The
Neurocognitive Basis of Early
ProsocialityRecent work has demonstrated that young children already engage in a variety
of prosocial actions and evaluate the prosociality of others’ behavior. A new
study highlights the neural mechanisms that subserve perception and
production of prosocial behavior in preschool children.Markus Paulus
Recent years have seen an increased
interest in the ontogenetic origins
and early development of human
prosociality. A number of studies
have demonstrated that young
children engage in a variety of
prosocial behaviors such as
helping, sharing, and comforting.
Additionally, they seem to predict
and evaluate the prosociality of
others’ behavior. Notwithstanding
this increased interest and the
relevance of such prosocial
orientations for the development of
social functioning [1], research on the
neural bases of children’s early
emerging prosociality has remained
sparse. A new study by Jason Cowell
and Jean Decety in this issue of
Current Biology [2] now shows that
electrophysiological markers that
index cognitively controlled
appraisal (the late positive potential;
LPP) relate to preschool children’s
perception of prosociality and
antisociality in others, and predict
their own generosity in a subsequent
sharing situation. This indicates
that preschoolers’ sharing is not
an automatized behavioral routine,
but a cognitively controlled
process.
Young children’s tendencies to act
prosocially are indeed astounding.
They have been shown to help
strangers in need to finish an initiated,
yet not complemented action (e.g.,
by handing over a missing object [3]).
They share valuable resources with
known as well as anonymous others
[4], and they show empathic
reactions towards others in pain [5].
While numerous studies replicated
these phenomena, the underlying
processes have remained hotly
debated [6]. Particularly, the
psychological mechanisms and
motives of children’s sharing
decisions have been vividlydiscussed, ranging from altruistic
tendencies [7] to the rewarding
nature of sharing [8] to strategic
motives in the service of
mere self-interest [9]. This debate is
partly informed by research on
preschool children’s perception,
prediction, and evaluation of others’
pro- and antisocial actions. Here,
research has shown that preschool
children evaluate an agent who
helped another person as more
positive and also share more with
him, while they tend to punish
others that are antisocial [10].
Additionally, preschool children’s
expectations of others’ generosity
towards their friends and nonfriends
are highly correlated to their own
inclination to share generously with
both types [11]. These studies
highlight a relation between
preschool children’s reasoning
and evaluation about others’
prosociality and their own inclination
to share. Yet, they leave open the
psychological mechanisms that
subserve these relations. A recurrent
issue of debate concerns the
question to what extent the processes
guiding prosocial behavior and
evaluations are automatic and rather
involuntary, or indeed cognitively
controlled.
Intriguingly, the recent paper by
Jason Cowell and Jean Decety
provides tentative answers to these
questions. Firstly, the authors
presented 3- to 5-year-oldpreschoolers
with short vignettes that depicted
pro- and antisocial behaviors while
assessing their electrophysiological
responses (Figure 1). Such behaviors
have already been shown to
differently attract infants’ attention
[12] and preschoolers have been
shown to prefer a pro- over an
antisocial actor when they are asked
to allocate resources to others [10].
The authors now find that early
markers that are indicative ofautomatic attentional processes, as
well as later markers that indicate
cognitively controlled processes,
differed between both scenarios. This
is particularly interesting as it
demonstrates that preschoolers’
preferences for pro- over antisocial
others is not merely due to simple
attentional processes, but is also
based on a cognitively
controlled evaluation of the others’
behaviors.
The second major finding
concerns the study’s second part.
After participants watched the
pro- and antisocial vignettes, they
had the opportunity to share
resources with an anonymous other
child. Children’s generosity towards
the anonymous other was predicted
by their neural responses to the
previously demonstrated vignettes.
Most interestingly, the later
electrophysiological markers, i.e.
markers that are indicative of more
controlled processes, predicted
children’s generosity. This finding
expands recent behavioral findings
on relations between young
children’s sharing and their
processing of others’ sharing
behavior. It might indicate that the
common neurocognitive substrate
that subserves both sharing behavior
and sharing expectations in young
children is cognitive appraisal of the
level of prosociality of particular
behaviors.
While this finding advances our
understanding of the neurocognitive
substrate underlying the early
development of prosocial behavior,
it also generates avenues for further
research and raises important
questions. For example, widely
noticed work has demonstrated
that preverbal infants already seem
to differentiate between pro- and
antisocially acting others. In
particular, they react more surprised
when an animated protagonist
approaches an agent who has
previously behaved antisocially
(e.g., hindered) towards him [12].
These studies have important
consequences for our understanding
of the origins of human morality.
Yet, it has been debated whether
infants’ reactions to these
displays indeed constitute a moral
evaluation of the respective agents
or can be more parsimoniously
explained by simple attentional
Figure 1. The roots of generosity in human development.
In a recent study [2], Cowell and Decety recorded EEG/ERPs while children viewed dynamic
scenarios depicting prosocial and antisocial behaviors. Subsequently, the children had the
opportunity to share resources with an anonymous other. In the EEG, the authors analyzed
ERP markers that relate to early attentional and later cognitively controlled processes. It
was found that neural markers of implicit moral evaluations, which are indicative of cognitively
controlled processing, predict generosity in young children in the subsequent resource
allocation context. This suggests that a cognitive appraisal of prosociality underlies both
the perception of others’ (pro- and antisocial) behavior as well as self prosocial action. (Photo
courtesy of Jean Decety.)
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of the displays [13]. It seems that
Cowell and Decety’s procedure
and analyses could be used to
disentangle the role of cognitive and
attentional processes in infants’
perception of pro- and antisocial
others, and thus reveal something
about the ontogenetic origins of
human morality.
Moreover, the present study is
restricted to one instance of prosocial
behavior, namely the sharing of
resources with others. Concurrent
[14] and longitudinal [15] behavioral
studies demonstrated that in preschool
children different instances of
prosocial behavior are not correlated
with each other. More specifically,
young children’s tendency to
provide instrumental help (i.e., low-cost
helping behavior that helps another
person to achieve their goal, for
example, by opening a door or
picking up an object from the ground)
does not relate concurrently to their
costly sharing (i.e., giving up own
resources to benefit another person),
nor does it predict the later
development of costly sharing.
Moreover, neuroscientific workwith infants has indicated that
different neurophysiological
activation patterns relate to the
emergence of the various instances
(i.e., helping, comforting)
of prosocial behavior, indicating
that prosocial action has qualitatively
distinct roots [16]. Here, it is
noteworthy that in Cowell and
Decety’s study children’s perception
of a variety of pro- and antisocial
actions predicted their sharing
behavior. Future studies are
necessary to see whether Cowell
and Decety’s findings are specific
for one type of prosocial action (i.e.,
sharing) or extend also to other
instances of prosociality (i.e., helping,
comforting).
Finally, the neurophysiological
measures were not obtained
during children’s actual prosocial
responding, but in an independent
assessment/situation in advance of
the sharing situation. Although the
current results point strongly to
the neurocognitive substrate
underlying early sharing, they raise
the question of whether the same
neurocognitive processes are indeed
involved in children’s real-timedecision making in a sharing
situation. It seems that the
neuroscientific examination of the
ontogenetic roots of human
prosociality and morality has just
begun.
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